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NOTES
LABOR LAW-REINSTATEMENT IN A UNION-JURISDICTION
OF COURTS TO ORDER
The defendant, trustee of a local union, caused plaintiff's
employer to discriminate against plaintiff by threatening a strike
if plaintiff was not fired. This occurred after the defendant trustee
had maliciously discharged plaintiff from the union. Plaintiff
brought an action in the Federal District Court of Alaska for
reinstatement in the union and for damages, both compensatory
and punitive, for exclusion therefrom. Held, action dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. An unfair labor practice had been com-
mitted by the union, and, according to Section 10(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, jurisdiction rests exclusively with
the National Labor Relations Board to decide cases involving
unfair labor practices. Born v. Cease, 101 F. Supp. 473 (D.C.
Alaska 1951).
It is well settled that jurisdiction rests exclusively with the
National Labor Relations Board to hear unfair labor practice
charges,1 and that in redressing the wrong, the board may direct
the payment of wages lost as a result of the unfair labor practice.2
However, with respect to the dismissal of the plaintiff's request
for reinstatement in the union and punitive damages, the decision
would seem not in accord with a sound interpretation of Section
10 (a). This section of the Taft-Hartley Act states, in effect, that
the board alone shall have jurisdiction over unfair labor prac-
tices. Section 8(b) of the act sets forth acts which on the part
of the labor organization constitute these unfair labor practices.
Nowhere in this section is to be found a statement to the effect
that discharging a member from a union is a violation of the act.
In fact, the proviso of Section 8(b) (1) specifically acknowledges
"the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein." -
The board has construed the proviso to "remove the application
of a union's membership rules to its members from the proscrip-
tions of Section 8 (b) (1) (A), irrespective of any ulterior reasons
motivating the union's application of such rules or the direct
1. Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). Labor
Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a) (Supp.
1951).
2. In re Pen and Pencil Workers Union 19593, 91 NLRB 883 (1950).
3. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 158(b)(1) (Supp. 1951).
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effect thereof on particular employees." 4 Therefore, since Sec-
tion 10 (a) clearly does not give jurisdiction to the board over
questions of reinstatement in a union and punitive damages
resulting therefrom, only the courts could have such jurisdiction.
Not only does the decision seem to find no support in the
act, but it also appears to be in conflict with well-settled juris-
prudence. Courts have repeatedly entertained suits for reinstate-
ment brought by discharged union members,' thus indicating that
they have never considered jurisdiction in such cases to be vested
exclusively in the board. It appears that the courts assume juris-
diction in order merely to perform one of the functions for which
the courts were established, namely, to extend to wrongfully
injured persons the protection of the law. They extend this
protection through various theories, some of which are the con-
tract theory,6 the property right theory,1 and the public policy
theory." Some cases have held that when a member joins a union,
he enters into a contract, "the terms of which are expressed in
the union constitution and by-laws." The union may demand
of the member anything that is within the provisions of that con-
tract, but nothing else. When a union member is expelled for
reasons not stated or reasonably implied from those provided for
by the contract, the courts say that there has been a breach of
the contract and, consequently, an improper discharge justifying
the protection of the court.'0 Other cases have held that union
benefit payments," a man's trade, and his union membership 12
are property rights, and that when a union member is improperly
4. International Typographical Union, 86 NLRB 951, 957 (1949). See also
Conway's Express, 87 NLRB 972 (1949) and Union Starch and Refining Co.,
87 NLRB 779 (1949) where the board pointed out that the denial to the union
of the right to demand the discharge of an employee under a valid union-
security contract for reasons other than the non-payment of initiation fees
and dues, did not interfere with the union's right under the Section 8(b) (1) (a)
proviso to deny membership to an employee upon any ground it wishes.
5. Schneider v. Local Union No. 60, United Ass'n Journeymen Plumbers,
116 La 270, 40 So. 700 (1905); Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923); Shapiro v. Gehlman, 278
N.Y. 785 (1935); Reilly v. Hogan, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 864 (1942).
6. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev.
1049 (1951); Notes, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 178 (1938), 45 Yale L.J. 1494 (1936).
7. See Summers, supra note 6.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176 N.E. 791 (1931); Polin v. Kaplan,
257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931).
11. Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective and Benevolent Union, 75 Cal.
308, 17 Pac. 217 (1888); Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl.
70 (1921).
12. LoBianco v. Cushing, 117 N.J. Eq. 593, 177 Atl. 102 (Ch. 1935).
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expelled, he is deprived of these rights and therefore entitled to
the protection of the court. To further protect the union member,
a few courts have required the provisions in union constitutions
and by-laws to be consistent with public policy 13 and natural
justice.14 Thus, whenever a member is expelled because of a
provision which is opposed to public policy, the courts will render
their protection. 15 Under any of these theories, the judicial rem-
edy is usually reinstatement in the union and damages caused
by the improper expulsion.' 6 Once the court has found an, im-
proper expulsion, it holds the unionliable to the injured party
for any damages sustained as a result of the wrong committed. 7
If wrongful expulsion was in bad faith or malicious, the courts
in some instances have also awarded punitive damages.'8 In some
cases unwarranted discharge of union members by union officials
has been prevented in advance through injunctive process. 19
The preceding not only illustrates the jurisdiction, but also
the power and duty of the courts to review and rule upon matters
pertaining to reinstatement of discharged union members in a
union and damages for wrongful expulsion therefrom.
Darrell Daniel DesOrmeaux
MINERAL RIGHTS-OIL ROYALTIES As FRUITS
The appellee received royalty payments from oil and gas
leases, entered into prior to his marriage, upon his separate prop-
13. Schneider v. Local Union No. 60, United Ass'n Journeymen Plumbers,
116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905).
14. Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N.Y. Supp. I (Sup. Ct. 1919).
15. Schneider v. Local Union No. 60, United Ass'n Journeymen Plumbers,
116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905).
16. See cases cited notes 5 and 10, supra.
17. See cases cited note 5, supra; Johnson v. International of the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 54 Nev. 332, 16 P. 2d 658 (1932).
18. Schneider v. Local Union No. 60, United Ass'n Journeymen Plumbers,
116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905); Grand International Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923); Walker v. Grand
Int'l Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 186 Ga. 811, 199 S.E. 146 (1938);
Kinane v. Fray, 111 N.J.L. 553, 168 Atl. 724 (1933).
19. Otis Loney v. Wilson Storage and Transfer Co., 8 Labor Cases 66,663
(1944). Subsequent to the decision in the subject case the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in Jones v. Hansen, 57 So. 2d 224 (La. 1952), affirmed the dismissal
of a suit for compensatory and exemplary damages against a number of
members of a local union (including one charged with having acted in his
official capacity as secretary) for allegedly having wrongfully disciplined the
plaintiffs to their monetary damage in employment relationships. The
defense was apparently not urged nor did the court consider the question
